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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
AMY J. WALTERS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
NATIONAL BEVERAGES, INC., a 
corporation, and STREATOR CHEV-
ROLET COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 10582 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STREATOR CHEVROLET COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a contract action in which plaintiff has sued 
defendants for breach of a contract respecting the award 
of prizes in a sweepstakes drawing contest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court granted defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the summary judgment set aside 
and the case remanded for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Those facts set forth in appellant's statement of facts 
are accurate. However, certain other undisputed facts 
must be brought to the attention of the court in addition 
to those stated by appellant. 
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Appellant gave the following pertinent testimony as to 
her understanding and intention with respect to the 
drawing (R.41, pp. 26 & 27): 
"Q Mrs. Walters, directing your attention to the 
time prior to the drawing at the Streator Chevrolet 
Company, and particularly to the times during which 
you were making out and depositing entry blanks, now, 
during that period of time did you have an understand· 
ing as to whether or not the prizes were to be awarded 
in the exact sequence of the tickets drawn? 
A I took it that they would be drawn as it looked 
like it said on the entry blank. 
Q Well, I-
A And I certainly prayed my name would be drawn 
first. 
Q Well, what I want to know is what your under-
standing was. 
A That's how I understood it. 
Q And you expected that at the time of the drawing 
at the Streator Chevrolet Company, the first prize 
would be drawn first, the second second, and so on 
through the whole of the 25 or 26 prizes; is that true? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was your understanding when you-
A The highest value first. 
Q And was that your understanding when you pre-
pared, made out and deposited all of the entry tickets 
which you did prepare, make out and deposit? 
A That's right. I wouldn't have bothered with it if 
I had known it was otherwise. 
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Q I see. But that was your clear understanding? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, did that understanding change at any time 
prior to the contest? 
A No." 
Respondents' intention and understanding is set forth 
in the following paragraph of the affidavit of Mr. Trager, 
a managing agent (R. 7 & 8): 
"6. That at the time the general offer was first made 
by defendants to award the listed prizes to the winners 
of the drawing and at all times subsequent thereto de-
fendants understood and intended that the order of 
drawing was to be that selected by them, and defend-
ants had no reason to suppose that plaintiff had a dif-
ferent understanding of the offer." 
The order of drawing selected by defendants was, as 
indicated in appellant's brief, five Pepsi-Cola winners 
first, then the fifth prize winner, five more Pepsi-Cola 
winners, then the fourth prize winner, etc., with the last 
ticket drawn being the winner of the first prize. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO VALID CONTRACT WAS MADE BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO 
THE SWEEPSTAKES DRAWING BECAUSE THE 
PARTIES HAD A DIFFERENT INTENT AND UNDER-
STANDING WITH RESPECT TO A MATERIAL ELE-
MENT, THE ORDER OF DRAWING. 
This defendant does not deny that a unilateral general 
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offer was made by the defendants. The terms of that 
offer are contained on Exhibit P-1 (R. 33) which is the 
entry blank. This defendant further agrees that a con-
tract can be formed by the unconditional acceptance of a 
unilateral offer, and that the acceptance may be made by 
the act of the offeree in properly filling out a contest 
blank and depositing it for drawing for prizes. 
However, even when the purported offer is relatively 
uncomplicated, and the acceptance may be by the doing 
of a simple act, all other elements necessary to the for-
mation of a contract must be present. For example, there 
must be a legal consideration, mutual assent or meeting 
of the minds, reasonable certainty as to material terms, 
and absence of extrinsic fraud, duress or illegality. 
This respondent bases this point of its argument on 
the proposition that the offer is either silent, uncertain, 
or ambiguous with respect to the order in which the 
prizes were to be assigned to the tickets drawn, or, if one 
prefers, the order in which the tickets being drawn were 
to be assigned to the prizes. With the offer being thus 
lacking in clarity, reasonable minds could come to dif-
ferent, yet reasonable, conclusions as to the order of 
assignment of prizes or tickets, and each could intend 
different terms. If each party intended the same order 
of assignment of prizes, a contract would result, but if 
each party, without knowledge of the differing intend-
ment of the other, had a different understanding as to 
the order of assignment of prizes to tickets drawn, the 
requisite mutual assent, meeting of the minds, would be 
missing and no contract would be formed. 
In the instant case the offer consisted of Ex. P-1 (R. 
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33), which is the entry blank. It is specified in the offer 
that the Corvair coupe was to be first prize and the other 
four major prizes were to be those thus designated. The 
offer then said "the next 20 winners each receive 12 cases 
of Pepsi-Cola." The only reference in Ex. P-1 to the 
manner of selection of winners is the statement: 
"4. Winners will be selected by a drawing to be 
held at Streator Chevrolet, 3: 00 p.m., Nov. 28, 1964." 
There is a significant difference between a designation 
of the order and rank of the prizes being awarded (that 
is, which shall be the first, which, the second, and so 
forth) and a designation of the manner by which the one 
who is to have the prize shall be selected. The reference 
to the "next 20 winners" referred to, and was a part of, 
the designation of the order and rank of the prizes, i.e., 
which prize shall take which place in the order of rank-
ing. The statement "Winners will be selected by a draw-
ing" is a designation of the manner in which the winners 
are to be selected. Nowhere in the offer is there a state-
ment as to which ticket drawn shall be given which prize. 
The undisputed evidence in this case is that the offeror 
intended and believed that it reserved the right and 
power to designate the order in which the tickets drawn 
should be assigned to the prizes, and that the offeree, 
Mrs. Walters, intended and believed that the first ticket 
drawn would, as a matter of contract, get the "First 
Prize." She did not intend that Streator Chevrolet have 
any power or right to designate a different order of as-
signing prizes, no matter how fair or impartial the 
method to be designated may be. 
The record on this point is short and clear. Mrs. Wal-
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ters' position is stated in her disposition (R.41, pp. 26 & 
1 
27), which reads as follows: 
"Q Mrs. Walters, directing your attention to the 
time prior to the drawing at the Streator Chevrolet 
Company, and particularly to the times during which 
you were making out and depositing entry blanks, now, 
during that period of time did you have an understand-
ing as to whether or not the prizes were to be awarded 
in the exact sequence of the tickets drawn? 
A I took it that they would be drawn as it looked 
like it said on the entry blank. 
Q Well, I-
A And I certainly prayed that my name would be 
drawn first. 
Q Well, what I want to know is what your under-
standing was. 
A That's how I understood it. 
Q And you expected that at the time of the drawing 
at the Streator Chevrolet Company, the first prize 
would be drawn first, the second second, and so on 
through the whole of the 25 or 26 prizes; is that true? 
A Yes. 
Q And that was your understanding when you-
A The highest value first. 
Q And was that your understanding when you 
prepared, made out and deposited all of the e~try 
tickets which you did prepare, make out and deposit? 
A That's right. I wouldn't have bothered with it if 
I had known it was otherwise. 
Q I see. But that was your clear understanding? 
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A Yes. 
Q Now, did that understanding change at any time 
prior to the contest? 
A No." 
The defendants' position is clearly stated in the affi-
davit of Mr. Trager, a managing agent (R. 7 & 8). It is 
uncontested and reads as follows: 
"6. That at the time the general offer was first made 
by defendants to award the listed prizes to the winners 
of the drawing and at all times subsequent thereto 
defendants understood and intended that the order of 
drawing was to be that selected by them, and defend-
ants had no reason to suppose that plaintiff had a dif-
ferent understanding of the offer." 
None of the parties claims the other to have been 
aware of the difference in their understandings of the 
purport of their supposed agreement. 
Under these circumstances is there a legal contract 
between plaintiff and defendants that the first ticket 
drawn shall be the winner of the first prize and the 
second ticket drawn the winner of second prize? We 
think not. The texts and cases hold that, under such 
circumstances as are here present, the law recognizes in 
favor of each of the parties the meaning he or she had 
intended, and no contract has been made. 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition, Sec. 95 states: 
"***If every word and every act had but one per-
missible meaning, it would not be necessary in con-
sidering the formation of contracts to inquire into the 
intent of a speaker or actor; but since this is not the 
case, if an expression, in view of the circumstances 
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under which it is used, may fairly mean either of two 
things, each party, unless he is in some way responsibie 
for the error, may attach his own interpretation. There. 
fore, where a phrase of a contract has no obvious mean. 
ing, or is reasonably capable of different interpreta. 
tions, and is in fact differently understood, there is no 
contract. The error in language may relate to the object 
to which the apparent agreement relates, it may relate 
to the persons with whom it is made, or to any of i~ 
terms.***" 
A portion of Note 5 to the above quoted text gives a 
specific example as follows: 
"In Peerless Glass Co. v. Pacific Crokery Co. 12! 
Cal. 641, 54 P. 101, plaintiff replied to an inquil') 
'freight allowance from Converse 74 cts.' The defendanl 
understood this was the freight rate, the inquirer thal 
it was a discount. The court held it could not say thal 
these words justified one interpretation more than the 
other, therefore, there was no contract." 
Section 605 of Williston on Contracts, Third Edition. 
includes the following text on pages 360 and 361 thereof 
"It may be supposed that A used the words in a 
sense different from that in which B understood them 
but that A had no reason to suppose that his under· 
standing would not also be B's, and B on his part haa 
no reason to suppose that his understanding would nol 
also be A's. In such a case, the law recognizes in favor 
of each party the meaning he intended, therefore, no 
contract has been made. The same rule applies where 
both parties know or have reason to know of the 
ambiguity." 
The American Law Institute Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts, Sec. 71, provides as follows: 
"Except as stated in Secs. 55, 70, the undisclosed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
understanding of either party of the meaning of his 
own words and other acts, or of the meaning of 
the other party's words and other acts, is material 
in the formation of contracts in the following cases 
and in no others: 
"(a) If the manifestations of intention of either 
party are uncertain or ambiguous, and he has no reason 
to know that they may bear a different meaning to 
the other party from that which he himself attaches 
to them, his manifestations are operative in the forma-
tion of a contract only in the event that the other party 
attaches to them the same meaning.***" 
This court, speaking in the case of E. B. Wicks Co. v. 
Moyle, 137 P.2d 342, 103 Ut. 554, decided in 1943, affirmed 
the above rules as prevailing in Utah by holding as 
follows: 
" 'In order that there may be an agreement, the par-
ties must have a distinct intention common to both and 
without doubt or difference. Until all understand alike, 
there can be no assent, and, therefore, no contract. 
Both parties must assent to the same thing in the same 
sense, and their minds must meet as to all the terms. 
If any portion of the proposed terms is not settled, or 
no mode is agreed on by which it may be settled, there 
is no agreement, although it is not necessary that all 
of the terms of the contract be settled by a single act, 
but the parties may settle on one term at a time, and 
their contract becomes complete when the last term is 
agreed on.' 17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 31, p. 359." 
Newton Oil Co. v. Bockhold, et al, 176 P.2d 904, 115 
Colo. 510, (1946) holds as follows: 
"A fundamental contractual requirement is that of 
certainty. The minds of the parties must have met. 
Where one party may have intended a certain obliga-
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tion, and the other party intended a different one, an1 
from the wording of the instrument itself there is nr 
rule by which the true intention can be determinee 
no contract results. 'The offer must not merely be con: 
plete in terms, but the terms must be sufficiently deli 
nite to enable the court to determine whether the con 
tract has been performed or not.' 1 Page on the La~ 
of Contracts, page 135, Sec. 95. 'As a promise ma1 
insufficiently specify the prices to be paid, so the co~ 
sideration for which the price is to be paid may be let 
equally uncertain, and in such a case it is not usuall1 
possible to invoke the standard of reasonableness ~ 
order to give the promise sufficient definiteness l! 
make it enforceable.' 1 Williston on Contracts, Re 
vised Edition, page 119, Sec. 42. 'The court can suppl: 
some elements in a contract, but they cannot mab 
one; and when the language in a contract is too un 
certain to gather from it what the parties intended 
the courts cannot enforce it.' Ryan v. Hanna, 89 Wash 
379, 154 P. 436. 'A court will not undertake to enforce 
a contract, unless by some lawful means it can ascer· 
tain and know just what the contract bound each parlj 
to do.' Lester v. Hinkle, 193 Ind. 605, 141 N.E. 463, 46~ 
'An offer must be so definite in its terms, or require 
such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promise> 
and performances to be rendered by each party an 
reasonably certain.' Restatement of the Law-Con· 
tracts, p. 40, Sec. 32.'' 
Richards v. Kuppinger, 278 P.2d, 395, 46 Wash. 2d 6i 
( 1955), shows the law of that state to be in accord wilt 
the above. In that case the court states: 
"It is perfectly clear that there was no meeting ol 
the minds between appellant and respondent, ano 
hence no express contract of sale. Nor can we find an!. 
'implied contract' between them. Both express ano 
implied contracts grow out of the intention of the 
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contracting parties and in each case there must be a 
meeting of the minds before there can be a contract. 
McKevitt v. Golden Age Breweries, 14 Wash. 2d 50, 
126 P.2d 1077; Troyer v. Fox, 162 Wash. 537, 298 P. 733, 
77 A.L.R. 1132." 
It was, of course, incumbent upon the offerors to select 
a method of assigning prizes to tickets that is honest, 
fair and equitable. The method chosen and used was 
openly announced and publicized on the day of the draw-
ing and well ahead of the drawing. No person objected. 
So far as respondents know, appellant does not urge that 
the method selected was unfair, rather, she urges that 
the method chosen was not that provided by the contract. 
It is difficult to suppose that plaintiff would urge that 
the offer bound the offeror to award first prize to the 
holder of the first ticket drawn if she had been the owner 
of the twenty-sixth ticket drawn instead of the second. 
The argument above is directed to the contentions of 
Point I and Point II of appellant's brief. Point III is dis-
cussed by the respondent, National Beverages, Inc., in 
its brief. This respondent adopts and includes herein by 
reference the arguments and authorities set forth in the 
brief of the respondent, National Beverages, Inc. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent, Streator Chevrolet Company, contends 
that the question of whether the document constituting 
the offer in this case is silent, uncertain or ambiguous 
with respect to the order of drawing may be determined 
by the court as a matter of law and is not an issue of 
fact. Admittedly this document constitutes the only rep-
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resentation of the terms of offer relied upon by appellant 
The trial court has decided this question of law in favor 
of respondents. The trial court further determined that 
the differing intendments and understandings of the 
parties on the point at issue precluded the formation of 
a contract between them. With these issues thus deter-
mined, the trial court properly granted respondents' 
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth 
in the briefs of the respondents, the decision of the trial 
court should be affirmed, with costs to respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER 
Counsel for Respondent 
Streator Chevrolet Company 
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